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INTRODUCTION
It is gratifying, hugely flattering, and at the same time somewhat
embarrassing to have to open a conference and then a symposium issue on
one's own academic work. No doubt understanding this embarrassment,
my colleague and good friend Ian Ayres suggested a way out: since the
conference was named "The Properties of Carol Rose," I should take the
occasion to talk about the various residences I have owned. A great idea,
and I did indeed think about it, because as Ian knows, I have had good
luck in that dimension, with more than my share of weird and interesting
addresses.
But as intriguing as Ian's idea would have been, there was really another
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topic altogether that I thought I should address at the opening of the
conference and now this symposium issue. That topic is the Missing Fifth
Panel, or as I will sometimes call it in this Introduction, the Ghost Panel.
When in the fall of 2004, Dean Harold Koh first broached the idea for
the conference preceding this Symposium, he appointed several of my
colleagues to act as organizers-Reva Siegel, Henry Smith, and Kenji
Yoshino-and a wonderful job they did, too. In preparation for a sequence
of panels, the organizers asked me to think about the ways that my work
might fall into large-ish categories. In response, I came up with the four
panel subjects that actually took place at the conference, and that are
reflected in this symposium issue. But I had a fifth panel too, and in fact, I
thought of it as the first. That panel was to be called "Property and
Language." By this I meant language in a large sense, as a set of symbols,
including the "languages" of art and narration and perhaps music as well,
and I worked out some ideas about who the panelists might be, including
most of the scholars who now have found a role in the other four.
But as time went along, it became clear that five panels would be just
too many for a day's conference. One had to go. The obvious one to go
was Property and Language. It was just a bit too obscure, idiosyncratic,
unconventional. . . . When the issue was broached, I agreed, of course,
since the decision to cut back was entirely understandable as a practical
matter and the other panels did in fact represent more standard areas of
property scholarship.
But still, the downsizing was a bit jarring, in a very familiar way. The
exploration of property and language is actually what I have often thought
to be my central project as a legal scholar. The title of my book, Property
and Persuasion, l even refers to that project. But alas, I have never
managed to convince many people how important it is to think of property
in connection with language in this larger sense of communication-
speech, stories, visual clues, expressions generally. And so, when the
"language" panel dropped out of the picture, my first thought was to moan
and groan, to utter the woe-is-me lamentations of Middlemarch's
Casaubon, the scholar who has churned and scribbled to no great effect in
the long run.2
But then, second thoughts took over. After all, what could be a better
opportunity than to change all that and to open this symposium with the
Ghost Panel-to bring it to life after all, directly at the beginning of this
Symposium? Hence this Introduction is devoted to the central question
that the Ghost Panel would have addressed: why do stories and pictures,
texts and subtexts, matter in property law? My answer, in brief, will be
1. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994).
2. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH (Modem Library 1984) (1871).
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that they matter because contrary to what many might think, property is
one of our most sociable of institutions. One person's property can only
exist, by and large, because other people accept it. In turn, that social
relationship of claim and recognition only exists because people are able
to communicate their claims and because others understand and more or
less agree to honor them. Language, in the broader sense of symbolism
and communication, makes property possible. And what is if anything
even more interesting, language in this broader sense also makes it
possible for property and entitlements to change meaning over time.
I. PROPERTY AS AN EXPRESSIVE ENDEAVOR
At this point I need to tum to a bit of autobiography. In my personal life,
I have always been a little skittish about owning property, at least property
of any tangible sort. The old cliche always seemed right to me:
possessions weigh a person down, and I was interested in staying light.
Moreover, before I studied law, I was not particularly interested in
property as a scholarly pursuit. I was an historian in my earlier academic
life, and while I was interested in legal subjects at that time, I had no
particular attraction to property law. In fact, I was far more interested in
political and constitutional relationships in quite distant times and places,
notably Continental Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early
nineteenth centuries.3
Property only became interesting to me when I started to see it through
the lens of legal study. The metaphor of "seeing" is deliberate: what
attracted me in the first instance was property law's impact on the visible
world. Indeed, property law looked to me like a language that directed the
shapes of physical spaces. I went to law school at the University of
Chicago, and in Chicago, one could take a tour through the downtown
"Loop" area, or even simply walk out the door of any building, and see
how the surrounding structures and streetscapes reflected property law.
The visual contours of the city reflected decisions about property, both
public and private.
One of my two property teachers at the University of Chicago was
Allison Dunham, an early proponent of incorporating. economic
approaches into law.4 Dunham also knew a great deal about the city, and
he was full of stories about it. One of those stories recounted why
3. I even wrote a few things in these areas, to wit, Carol M. Rose, Empire and Territories at the
End ofthe Old Reich, in THE OLD REICH: ESSAYS ON GERMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 1495- I806,
at 59 (James A. Vann & Steven W. Rowan eds., 1974); The Issue of Parliamentary Suffrage at the
Franlifurt National Assembly, 1848-1849, 5 CENT. EUR. HIST. 127 (1972).
4. The other was Owen Fiss, then teaching at Chicago, one of the truly inspirational teachers I
have encountered, whose interest in the civil rights aspects of property law also much affected my
entire class.
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 4 2006
4 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Supp.:l
Chicago's downtown Loop adjoins an almost structure-free Grant Park,
unfolding down from the building facades along Michigan Avenue and
extending all the way to the shoreline of Lake Michigan itself. The reason
was because in the later years of the nineteenth century, one of the
Michigan Avenue property owners-A. Montgomery Ward, which is to
say, the Montgomery Ward, founder of the mail-order and department
store chain-elaimed an easement for light and air across the landfill area
to the east of his Michigan Avenue building. The area was then a jumble
of railroad tracks, shanties, and junk heaps left over from the debris of the
Chicago fire of 1871, and the city of Chicago planned any number of
structures there, from power plants to post offices to museums. But it all
became an open Grant Park because Ward defied the city, the press, and
even his friends to block all construction except the Art Institute, a
concession that he later thought a mistake. What property lawyers refer to
as a "holdout" effectively shaped the park-a matter of considerable
municipal annoyance at the time, but even more considerable applause
later.5
And then there was the impact of zoning law, noticeable in Chicago, but
even more noticeable in New York. Once you know the history of New
York's zoning laws, you can tell why a building has the shape it does and
roughly its age. The "Ziggurat" buildings were constructed under the 1916
ordinance, which called for a "light plane" to allow sunlight to come into
the streets over skyscrapers that receded back in staircase form in the
upper stories.6 Buildings in a quite differep.t style, the tall slim towers that
are often set back in a plaza, derive largely from the era after the 1961
zoning changes; these changes attempted to relieve the boredom of
wedding-cake building shapes and to introduce more open space and
variety by allowing light to come around the sides of new buildings, rather
than over the top. 7 But those structures, too, generated a reaction, and
indeed a widespread dismay at the march of uninviting and inhumane tall
towers set back in empty and windy plazas, effectively telling the public to
keep out. And so one now finds arcades, fountains, and tables and chairs,
all responding to yet another zoning change, Manhattan's new open space
5. For Dunham's written account of this tale of recalcitrance and redemption, see Allison
Dunham, The Chicago Lake Front and A. Montgomery Ward, WELFARE COUNCIL OF METRO. CHIC.,
PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE AREAS app. (1966), reprinted in UNIV. OF CHIC. REc., at II (Winter
1979).
6. Rodney L. Cobb, Privately Owned Public Spaces: The New York City Experience, 33 URB.
LAW. 805, 807 (2001) (reviewing JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PUBLICLY OWNED PRIVATE SPACES (2000»;
see also id. at 805-12 (giving a brief history of New York zoning's effects on building shapes and
open spaces).
7. For the 1961 Zoning Resolution's effort to create more open space on the models of the then-
revolutionary Lever House and Seagrams Building, both attractive towers set in plazas, see Norman
Marcus, New York City Zoning-1961-1991: Turning Back the Clock-But with an Up-to-the-Minute
Social Agenda, 19 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 707, 715 (1992) (describing motivations for change to more
open buildings)
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regulations of 1984, which attempted to bring some vitality and user-
friendliness to the city's architectural amenities.8
It is not just the urban landscape that shows property law's visible
imprint. A window seat on a flight across the country reveals the visual
impact of the Land Ordinance of 1785, the first to decree the rectangular
survey of the lands of the new United States.9 Then, too, the peculiarities
of the laws that govern property in water keep the water inside the
riverbanks in the Eastern rivers, while encouraging its diversion outside
the banks in the Western rivers-one reason why the rivers of the
southwest are wrung dry during much of the year. 10
All this visual imagery made me start to think that the proper study of
property is communication, rhetoric, language. And indeed, once I began
to teach property it became apparent to me that property's communicative
aspects reflect a very ancient perception. Perhaps the most famous case in
American property law is Pierson v. Post, an early-nineteenth-century
New York case that concerned the acquisition of property in previously
unowned things. II The thing in question was a fox pelt: Did it belong to
the hunter who had been following it over a long chase? Or did it belong
instead to the "saucy intruder" (as the dissenting judge Livingston called
him) who had jumped out at the last minute and actually shot the beast?
Judge Livingston's engaging and powerful dissent dwelt on the
importance of incentivizing those who would hunt noxious animals, and of
giving due regard to the customs of these sportsmen. But nevertheless, the
court's majority, citing much venerable authority, decided that the fox
went to the shooter. Why? Because by shooting the fox (or mortally
wounding it) the shooter "manifests an unequivocal intention" to take
animal and remove it from its wild and free former life. Mere pursuit was
not enough; it did not give a clear enough "manifestation" to the world
and would lead to "quarrels and litigation" among claimants.
Now, this is a very freighted understanding of the ways in which a
8. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-222 (1984). The history and purpose of these
changes, including the role of the channing report by WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
SMALL URBAN SPACES (1980) is briefly described by Samuel E. Poole, Architectural Appearance
Review: The Good. the Bad, and the Consensus Ugly, 19 URB. LAW. 287, 303-04 (1987) (describing
motivations to limit unused spaces and create more inviting architectural amenities).
9. An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory (May
20, 1785), 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 375 (photo reprint 2005) (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1933).
10. For a brief description of the differences between eastern and western water law, see CAROL
M. ROSE, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment ofCommon Law Water Rights, in PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP, supra note I, at
163, 184-88. Another reason for the drying up of western rivers is the exploitation of groundwater
resources. See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 42-50 (2002) (describing the process using the example of the San Juan
River of Tucson, Arizona).
11. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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person comes to own something. First, there is that business about killing
the animal, or otherwise dominating it in order to own it. I will return to
this, because this method of establishing property rights has major
implications for environmental law. But second is the understanding that
this original act of acquisition involves language; an act of acquisition, it
seems, is a gesture that some relevant audience has to understand as a
claim. Property begins in an action that speaks out, a "manifestation," and
a manifestation in broad and dramatic strokes, too-the broader and more
dramatic as the scope of the intended audience expands toward the world
at large. 12
And third is another point: property begins in a social context. A
manifestation to inform the world means that there is in fact an audience
out there, and the audience has to "get it." This, too, is a very freighted
matter, because some audiences do not get it, given that there are quite a
variety of cultural "worlds" in the larger world. The result is that any
given property regime effectively privileges some speakers and audiences
over others. 13 Stuart Banner, one of the conference participants, has amply
illustrated this point in a series of fine works on the early history of
English settlement in New Zealand, Australia, Hawai'i, and North
America. 14 He has documented the ways in which the English understood
the language of property as agriculture. Insofar as native peoples farmed,
the English saw property, defined through crops, boundaries, fences. But
insofar as native peoples did not farm, or did not farm in ways that
resembled the English countryside, the English were much less likely to
see property. In the most tragic case of all, they saw no property at all in
native land uses in Australia, which the English viewed as up for grabs,
terra nullius in the Latin phrase, land waiting to be reduced to property. IS
Whatever language the Australian Aborigines were speaking, the
English settlers did not get it, and they generally regarded themselves as
12. Blackstone also described the acquisition of property through first taking as a "declaration"
that the taker "intends to appropriate the thing to his own use." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2
COMMENTARIES *9; see also Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1115-25 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between the character of
the communication and the size of the audience for property claims, noting broader strokes for larger
audiences).
13. I developed these arguments more fully in Property as the Origin ofTitle, 52 U. CHI. L. REv.
73 (1985), also appearing with slight modifications as Chapter I of PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP, supra note I, at II. For a much
more extensive consideration, see the work of my colleague Henry Smith, supra note 12.
14. STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER
(2005); Stuart Banner, Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in Nineteenth-
Century Hawaii, 39 LAW & SOC'y REv. 273 (2005); Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology
and Property Law in Early Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 95 (2005) [hereinafter Banner, Why Terra
Nullius?]; Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure in
Colonial New Zealand, 34 LAW. & SOC'y REv. 47 (2000); Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land:
Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807 (1999).
15. Banner, Why Terra Nullius?, supra note 14, at 100-04,107-12.
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simply taking unclaimed space. In a major shift in Australian
jurisprudence in 1992, however, the Australian High Court concluded that
the early settlers had misunderstood the claims underlying native land
uses. 16 As Australian legislatures and courts have struggled with the
reinstatement of Aboriginal rights to traditional uses, they have faced
another issue: what evidence will now justify Aboriginal claims?
Interestingly enough, one answer referred to language and
communication: in assessing the validity of claims to native title, the
courts initially were to look to a "spiritual connection" that Aborigines had
to a land area, which apparently meant, among other things, "actively
thinking about a place and talking about it," according to one
spokesperson. 17 Are there stories about this location? Are there Aboriginal
names for it? Does it appear in songs and celebrations? Those were
presumably among the questions to be asked. In the intervening years,
nonaboriginal anxieties over the sweep of these claims has led to the
amendment of the native title statute, such that a physical connection is
now required for a claim. This change in turn has raised the ire of
Aboriginal advocacy groups, however, who argue that spiritual
connections to the land are extremely important to their constituents, and
in effect that European settlers and their descendants need to be better
listeners to the ways that connection is communicated. 18
Simply the narrative and visual aspects of property undoubtedly draw
many scholars into the field-it would have been enough for me, at least. I
think it is fair to say that property scholars generally are people who like
maps and pictures, all of which relate to the communicative and
expressive aspects of property law. But beyond the aesthetic and tactile
attractions of the field, there is another and more theoretical reason to
focus on those expressive aspects. That reason is that the expressive
character of property can help to bridge the gap between the humanities on
the one hand, and law-and-economics scholarship on the other.
Let me backtrack here again for another bit of autobiography. My own
career as a legal scholar has coincided with the ascendancy of economic
thinking in the law. Though other disciplines have also been important
16. Mabo v. Queensland, II, (1992) 175 C.L.R. I, 33-34 (Aust!.) (holding that English
sovereignty was compatible with native title).
17. Gary D. Meyers & Sally Raine, Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition (Part If):
The Legislative Response to the High Court's Native Title Decisions in Mabo v. Queensland and Wik
v. Queensland, 9 TULSAJ. COMPo & INT'L L. 95,124-26 (2001).
18. Id at 125. For another account of the importance of stories in native claims, see Mary
Kancewick, Of Two Minds, in FROM THE ISLAND'S EDGE: A SITKA READER 3, 6 (Carolyn Servid ed.,
1995) (describing a hearing where a Tlingit elder made land claims based on stories of origins and
connections, and ended with the remark, "You say this is your land. Where are your stories?"). See
also Jennifer Wallace, Shifting Ground in the Holy Land, SMITHSONIAN MAG., May 2006, at 58, 64
(describing certain Israeli archaeologists' efforts to verify biblical stories, as well as Palestinians'
skeptical view that biblical archaeology is being used to justify illegal settlement).
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over the last generation or so, economics, together with such related fields
as game theory, rational choice, and economics-oriented cognitive
psychology, have all taken a very significant and even dominant position
in modem legal studies. I knew little about economic thinking when I
began to study law, but I quickly developed a somewhat peculiar
relationship to this field. I' was impressed that economics yielded a
disciplined approach to many legal subjects, even though economists
sometimes referred to self-interest so relentlessly as to appear coarse and
overreaching. Even taking that distasteful fact into account, I was
surprised to find that others in the humanities took stances that were
persistently anti-economic, anti-market, and in a certain sense anti-
property. It seemed to me that market activities were a quite interesting
part of human endeavors, and clearly a matter of great importance to the
way that people live their lives. Even more important, it seemed to me that
there is a somewhat neglected but critical element of cooperation at the
center of economic activities, something that I would have thought a
matter of considerable interest to the humanities, and something that I
tried to explore several times in my own work later on. 19 In short, I
thought that people in the humanities had much to learn from the study of
economic pursuits.
But I also thought that humanists had and continue to have much to
offer back to the economists. Economists generally tend to accept
preferences as simply given, or in the economic lingo, "exogenous," and
to refer most decisions to a kind of core of self-interest that aims to satisfy
preferences as "exogenously" given. But where do people's preferences
come from? What makes people willing to suppress their own preferences
sufficiently to work with others toward common ends? And perhaps most
important, what makes people change their minds about preferences, and
about working with others? What, in short, persuades? Those questions
open the door to expressive issues-that is to say, to the humanities.
There are unquestionably many other legal areas in which the
expressive possibilities are rich indeed-eriminal law, for example.20 But
property approached in this way, as language and communication, opens
up a particularly rich area of inquiry, because the expressive qualities of
property are located squarely at the center of the intersection between
19. E.g., Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REv. 295 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Property
as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror ofBetrayal, 75 B.U.L. REv. 531 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 594
(1996) (describing uses of criminal "shaming sanctions" in reinforcing norms of the larger society); cf
Toni Massaro, The Meanings ofShame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L.
645, 693-99 (1997) (arguing that shaming sanctions' effects are inconsistent). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996) (giving a wide variety
of examples oflaw's expressive characteristics).
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economic and humanistic studies. Property, together with trade, make up
the heart of the economic enterprise. Property ownership supposedly
concentrates the costs and benefits of an owner's actions on the owner
herself: she takes the reward for good planning and hard work, and she
suffers the consequences of carelessness and sloth. Property also makes
owners identifiable, so that people can organize trades instead of grabbing
and fighting. These features of property enhance careful management of
resources, peaceable and mutually beneficial activities, and ultimately, as
Adam Smith put it, the wealth of nations. So far, so good. But why do
people think they own what they do? Why do they think that other people
own what they own, and why do they respect others' claims, even against
their own self interest? What makes something look like an entitlement,
and what makes people change their minds about entitlements? Those are
all questions that hinge on communications and signals among people, and
they form the core of my own theoretical interest in property as an
expressive enterprise. That enterprise occupies a middle space between
economics and the humanities, a space in which each discipline can cast
light on the other.
Unfortunately, it is often a space that is passed over without
observation, much less examination. Here is an example: there is another
famous story in economics, again about the origins of property, but here it
is about property taken as an entire institution rather than property in this
or that thing (as in the Pierson case about the fox). There are a number of
versions of the larger institutional story, including one by John Locke,
another by William Blackstone, and more recently, one by Harold
Demsetz.21 In all these versions, the institution of property is explained as
a kind of cost-benefit calculation: property regimes emerge when self-
interested people figure out that it is worth it. This story appears again and
again in property theory, with what appears to be a breathtaking
oblivousness to the story's own expressive function.
In Demsetz's version, the chief example is the North American fur trade
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.22 The story plays out in what
are effectively two snapshots. The first snapshot is taken just before the
beginning of the trade, when native American groups hunted fur-bearing
animals for their own use. At this time the hunters had no particular
concern for the locations where they hunted, since the animals were
plentiful and since there was no need to worry about their conservation.
Enter the Europeans, who wanted the furs for textiles: in the face of this
huge jump in demand, native people began to hunt much more intensely,
21. The connections between these authors and their property evolution story is developed in
ROSE, supra note I.
22. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 354-59
(1967).
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leading to a decline in the animal population, and ultimately to the second
snapshot. By this later time, Native Americans had established family
plots for their own exclusive hunting use, each keeping some animal
habitat as a kind of reproductive "bank" and moderating their hunting
activities in order to maximize the economic yield. That is to say,
according to this story, property rights had emerged when conditions had
made it worth it to move beyond wide-open access to the animals-worth
it in order to manage scarce resources and to encourage the proper level of
activity.
But some property scholars have in effect said, hey, wait a minute. What
happened between Snapshot 1 and Snapshot 2?23 And well they might ask.
How did a propertyless people understand property signals at all? For
example, how did they understand the blazes on trees that families used to
mark out their areas? Did they borrow those signals from a culture of
property in some other resources, say, tools? Even if they did figure out
the signals for a new kind of property, why did they pay any attention,
when self-interest would dictate grabbing up the nicely-preserved animals
in spite of the signals? One answer might be that they were afraid of those
who had already staked claims, and no doubt this went some distance. But
a property regime only works if most people do not have to guard their
property most of the time or resort to violence to protect it. To be sure,
some modicum of owner vigilance is required to keep a property regime
functioning; otherwise, among other things, property claims would blur.
But guarding and violence are expensive and wasteful, and they can drain
away any gains--or indeed any meaning-from having property rights in
the first place. That is to say, a property regime only works if the owners
have managed to convince others not only that they should understand the
claim but that they should accept it too. In the game theory lingo, the
relevant audience tacitly agrees to play "dove" to the owner's "hawk."24
But where did that initial understanding and agreement come from?
In effect, the oft-repeated cost-benefit account of property's institutional
origins is just a story, quite at odds with the presumption of self-interest
with which it begins, quietly smoothing over the difficulties in an effort to
persuade an audience that property regimes will come to the rescue when
and where people need them. It is all the more striking that another famous
story starts the same way but goes in the opposite direction, and rather
23. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 362
(2002) (noting the difficulties of moving from open access to property, and citing collective action
problems in both scenarios); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part II, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 325, 336-38 (1992) (criticizing Demsetz for failing to note that the commons problem is
repeated in efforts to manage the commons).
24. See, e.g., Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the
Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (200 I) (analyzing
property as a "hawk/dove" game).
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more convincingly, too, on the assumption of self-interested actors: This is
the Tragedy of the Commons, as Garrett Hardin famously named it,25 It
tells a tale in which the actors inexorably fail to find ways to manage
resources that are open to all. Here people do not understand and accept
any signals, so that the resources that they all use fall to pieces. Who, after
all, will take the lead in organizing a property regime, at a cost of time and
effort to herself for the sake of others? Who will follow, at a cost of
immediate gratification for the sake of a highly uncertain future apparent
good? The cost-benefit property story as represented by Demsetz (and
Locke and Blackstone before him) is a leap of optimism, and it effectively
uses a narrative form to conceal the difficulties.
But of course this is something that stories can do. As narrative theorists
have argued-beginning with Aristotle's Rhetoric-a story can persuade,
preparing an audience for action.26 The audience can believe that what is
effectively a cooperative institution can emerge from simple comparisons
of costs and benefits among self-interested actors, however much the
theory of rational self-interest might reject this conclusion. Just so with
this very famous tale of the origins of property as an institution: the
economic argument falls back on a story.
And so, this is why, at the outset of this conference's planning, I thought
there should be a fifth panel, or rather a first panel, on property and
language. Property takes some persuading in order to happen at all.
But of course, the panel was not to be. And so, in the absence of the
fifth panel itself, it seems appropriate to bring up a kind of next-best
solution: to raise some issues that a ghost panelist, a member of the
missing Fifth Panel, might have noted in the other four panels. If one
thinks about the relationship of property to language, how might the broad
issues of language appear in the four topics that actually make up this
symposium-that IS, commons, nature, takings, and exchange
relationships?
That is the question to which I will devote the remainder of this
introduction.
II. FOUR PANELS IN THE LIGHT OF A (MISSING) FIFTH
How might the ghost panelists approach the topics of other panels? Here
is a brief overview: with respect to the first two panels, commons and
25. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy o/the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). For an earlier but
less felicitously named analytical presentation of the same commons issues, see H. Scott Gordon, The
Economic Theory 0/ a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954)
(analyzing commons problems in the example of overfishing).
26. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, 228-32 (I416b-1417b) (Lane Cooper trans., Appleton-Century-
Crofts 1932) (describing the use of narrative in persuasion); DAVID CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE, AND
HISTORY 24, 45-46, 57-65, 149-50 (1986) (connecting narration to a theory of action and community
change).
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nature, the ghost panelists will take up subjects that relate to the
possibilities and difficulties in establishing what might be called "texts" of
property-that is, signals, like killing the fox, that announce one's claims
and that are generally accepted as establishing or maintaining property
rights. Both the commons and the environment confront property
institutions with a major obstacle: in the inherited European property
traditions, it is very difficult to find any kind of text that marks out
property rights in either the commons or the environment. And of course,
no text means no property-no claims can be made and none understood.
This may be a good thing or a bad, but however one judges that issue, the
very intractability of commons and environment makes these subjects all
the more useful for exploring what it actually means to signal and
understand a property claim.
With respect to the remaining two panels, takings and exchange
relationships, our ghost panelists will concentrate on something quite
different, what literary theorists would call "subtexts." Takings issues and
exchange relationships are rife with property utterances. No problem about
property texts here: on the contrary, these areas are if anything overloaded
with property talk. But on closer examination, one also finds in these areas
a host of subtexts, among them many implicit messages about who gets to
make property claims and who does not, along with the resulting questions
of status anxiety. With respect to these panels, the ghost panelists are thus
especially interested in locating and exploring not texts but subtexts-the
communications that lie just behind the express texts.
A. Finding Property Texts: Commons and Nature
1. Property Texts in the Commons
It is generally a tricky business to tell a story of property about the
commons, but the trickiness varies, depending on what one means by the
commons. To be more precise about the matter, what are called
"commons-es" are actually two different kinds of institutions. One is a
limited common property, where something is owned jointly and shared
by a defined group of people; the other is an unlimited common resource,
or as it is sometimes called, an "open access" resource.27 In the garden
variety case, a text of property normally signals that something is owned
by someone in particular. But where things are designated as "commons,"
they are not owned individually but rather owned in common with others,
27. This distinction has been stressed especially by Elinor Ostrom, one of the most prolific recent
theorists about resources held in common. See her GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 48 (1990) (distinguishing open-access resources from those
managed by a group, which she calls common pool resources). See text at note 40 infra.
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or not owned at all. As it turns out, though, property texts do actually
show up regularly in connection with limited commons-es, where a
defined group claims something jointly, even if the property signals they
send sometimes seem rather unorthodox. Open access commons-es are a
much more dicey matter, as we shall see. But let us deal with the easier
case first, the limited common property.
The Commons as Limited Common Property. Is there a language
through which groups of people can secure their joint rights in resources?
The answer is, yes, sometimes. The common law tradition is not entirely
friendly to group rights, particularly in the United States.28 Nevertheless,
groups lay claims to things quite frequently, sending out a great variety of
signals of their claims even when those claims are extra-legal or even
illegal. A recent Yale Law School graduate, Daniel Nazer, has written an
article about the group property claims of surfers.29 Apparently these
claims are a well-known phenomenon among surfers, and they bear the
name "localism." Local surfers will let outsiders know very rapidly that
they are not welcome, signaling their own exclusive claims through dirty
looks, rude comments, and jostling, some of it pretty heavy-handed.30
The "localism" phenomenon in certain ways is not all that different
from the group claims in a movie line: people in the line have a recognized
time-limited claim to get their tickets, prioritized by the order of their
arrival in line; line-breaking elicits dirty looks, muttering, and some
chastisement. Jostling seems somewhat unlikely in a line for movies, but it
would not be surprising in lines for especially highly valued or unique
events, for example, World Series tickets or a rock concert.31 The person
who comes late is expected to see the line and to understand that the way
to claim the resource is to take a place at the back.
Both surfers' customs and the movie line have recognizably economic
functions: localism prevents overcrowding in a limited resource, while the
movie line provides an orderly way to allocate rights to another limited
resource. Indeed the movie line allocates rights by giving the highest claim
to those who value the resource most, at least insofar as value is roughly
approximated by early arrival.
Notice that both these types of group claims announce a limited
28. See Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection:
Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances, in THE DRAMA
OF THE COMMONS 233, 251-53 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) (noting the anti-democratic or archaic
character of some group rights and their rejection in American law).
29. Daniel Nazer, The Tragicomedy ofthe Surfers' Commons, 9 DEAKIN L. REv. 655 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Paul McHugh, Surfing'S Scary Wave: "Localism" Intensifying at Ocean Breaks,
S.F. CHRON., May IS, 2003, at CII (reporting on beating incident, far beyond normal practice of
"vibing"--cursing at-strangers).
31. Bargain shopping also elicits this behavior. See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Wilma Was a Wimp
Compared to Black Friday, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29, 2005, at BI (reporting line-cutting violence in
Orlando Wal-Mart laptop sale, other incidents of shopping violence).
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common property, and they depend heavily on communication both for
their formation and for their enforcement. It is important to notice too,
however, that some of the signaling in group rights has a distinctly
unattractive side: there is a considerable load of threatening symbolism in
many group claims to entitlement. Many property scholars are familiar
with the anthropologist James Acheson's fascinating studies of the lobster
fishery in the vicinity of Monhegan Island, a small jewel of an island off
the rocky coast of Maine.32 The Monhegan lobstermen have worked out
ways to police themselves so as to avoid overfishing among themselves,
and even more important, to exclude outsiders from the island's fishery
altogether. Until recently, the exclusion of outsider fishers was illegal
under Maine law: fishing waters were supposed to be open to all on an
equal basis. But the Monheganers kept outsiders at bay by a set of
property-claiming texts that are picturesque but thuggish: marking coarse
sexual symbols on outsiders' traps, or in more serious instances, cutting
the buoys from the outsiders' traps to make the traps impossible to
locate.33 Gestures of this sort are representations of violence, and they are
intended to be understood as a warning of worse to come in case of future
trespass.
Similarly, some of my own recent work has focused on racially
restrictive covenants in the first half of the twentieth century.34 Even at a
time when these covenants were legal and widespread in cities, the most
sharply segregated white neighborhoods did not have them. They did not
need them, because they used violence instead.35 When a minority family
rented or purchased a home in those neighborhoods, it was likely to find
eggs and tomatoes thrown at its doors, racist signs painted on its walls,
and occasionally a brick heaved through the window. This behavior too
was a kind of representation of violence that leached over into actual
violence, and it too was intended to convey the threat of much worse if the
minority family did not leave. It sent a message of ownership: that the
neighborhood belonged to the white residents, to the exclusion of all
others.
Violent or symbolically violent messages of this sort are a particularly
crude form of group property texts. Intimidating texts like these also
illustrate that the law sometimes intervenes to prevent ownership and to
prevent the symbols of ownership too. And with good reason: the
symbolic gestures in a sense create an ownership claim that the larger
32. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
33. [d. at 48-49,75.
34. Carol M. Rose, The Story of Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169 (Gerald
Komgold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
35. THOMAS PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO: NEIGHBORHOOD DETERIORATION AND
MIDDLE-CLASS REFORM, CHICAGO, 1880-1930, at 198 (1978).
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public rejects. Graffiti in public spaces operate in somewhat the same way
and raise objections of the same sort, though of course less serious: they
imply that someone is personally appropriating spaces and things that
should be common to everyone.36
In fact, the greater the perpetrators' efforts to keep these symbolic
gestures anonymous, and the more the gestures themselves slip into
violence, the more marginal they become to the normal functioning of
property. Anonymity disguises the messenger, signaling that-unlike most
property-negotiations are not possible; violence betrays the messenger's
knowledge that the claim of entitlement-again unlike most property-is
not accepted by the larger community. Once again, property's usefulness
springs from the legibility of the claim, and from the intended audience's
understanding and acceptance; these features relieve the claimant from
having to guard or use force to protect the claim, and they open the door to
negotiation and trade. The sneak attack and the use of violence, on the
other hand, strongly suggest that even the perpetrators know that beyond
their own group, their claims are neither accepted nor acceptable in the
larger community.
Commons as Open Access. Not all limited common property claims are
as nasty as those of the racially exclusive neighborhood. Some are as
productive as traditional community grazing areas or forests,37 and others
are as innocuous as the Bingo Club's regular Friday night use of the
comer table at the Cup and Saucer Cafe. Moreover, modem legal
instruments can help to guide limited common property arrangements into
democratic decisionmaking institutions.38 And in general, if these limited
commons were not so useful and normally benevolent, they would not be
so interesting-or they would only be interesting only to those who study
pathologies.
But the second widespread understanding of the "commons" is often
thought to be pathological under all circumstance. This is the wide-open
and unlimited version of the commons, and it is especially familiar from
Hardin's famous title, The Tragedy ofthe Commons. 39 Here no one has the
right to exclude anyone else from the common resource. Elinor Ostrom, a
distinguished political scientist and leading scholar of limited common
property regimes, argues that it is a misnomer to use the word "commons"
36. See. e.g., CRAIG CASTLEMAN, GETTING UP: SUBWAY GRAFFITI IN NEW YORK 12, 25,46-48
(I 982} (describing the writer's sense both of public service and theft).
37. See. e.g., Arun Agrawal, Rules. Rule Making. and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between
Rule Systems and Resource Use, in ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL
RESOURCES 267 (1994) (describing community-based forestry practices in India); Henry E. Smith,
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000)
(describing medieval common fields).
38. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001)
(describing the potential for a modernized and liberalized limited commons).
39. Hardin, supra note 25.
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for the open-access situations that Hardin described; in her view the
"commons" often implies some constraint on access so that group
management is possible-that is to say, resources held as "common
property" really mean resources under group control.40 Nevertheless,
whether due to Hardin's terminology or to sloppy usage over a longer
period, we seem to be stuck with the word "commons" to mean open
access too.
Hardin's essay and much other property theory suggest that this kind of
commons is headed for ruin. Where access to a resource is unlimited, no
one has much incentive to invest in its maintenance, and everyone has an
incentive to take as much and as quickly as possible, before others arrive
and do likewise. The result, it is said, is decimation-nonrenewable
resources (like mining areas or oil fields) are grabbed up too quickly, and
renewable resources (like fisheries or forests) are gutted and trashed
beyond repair. All this turns into one of the many arguments for property,
as in Demsetz's story of the evolution of property: once they are owned,
formerly-open-access resources become subject to the owner's careful
management--eareful because she takes the rewards of good husbandry
and feels the pain ofunderinvestment or overuse.41
Nevertheless, in spite this familiar warning, there are some areas in
which open access has been very persistent in our law. Roadways and
navigable waterways are especially notable in this respect; these are
physical locations that have historically been open to the public for
purposes of navigation, transportation, and travel. Open access in roads
and waterways does not escape property language, and they are often
designated as belonging to the public, as in the term "public trust" that
often designates these resources. This terminology implies a set of
resources owned and managed by larger governments for the use of the
entire public.
There are reasons why such resources are held open to all, even though
public access causes physical wear and tear and entails regular repair.
Roads and waterways are avenues of commerce and communication, and
the more people use them, the better off we all are, since wider fields of
commerce and interaction expand both the purse and the mind.42 In the
well-known saying, the more the merrier.
Over the last generation or so, there has been some argument for public
access to physical locations other than transportation and communication
40. Thomas Dietz et aI., The Drama ofthe Commons, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 3, 11-12
(Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing the critique of Hardin's conception of"commons").
41. Dernsetz, supra note 22.
42. I explored some of these issues in Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
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lanes, notably beach and recreation areas.43 Even more expansive have
been the arguments for an enlarged understanding of a public trust to
cover environmentally sensitive resources.44 Such subjects have generated
much controversy over the meaning and uses of open access.45 But even
more recently, in the wake of a revolution in telecommunications, the
open-access debate has swung quite sharply to another set of subjects
altogether, involving not physical resources but rather intellectual ones. A
whole new generation of scholars now argues that for the sake of greater
creativity, information should be opened up to all, along with the major
new means of conveying information, the Internet. This discussion takes
the form of a set of multi-faceted attacks on conventional intellectual
property-patent, trademark, copyright.46
Are there symbolic expressions of property in the wide open intellectual
commons? In some ways there should not be. After all, the unlimited,
wide-open·access commons is precisely defined by the absence of
property. Such imagery as we have reflects this property-less-ness:
cyberspace, for example. The word calls forth a kind of 2001: A Space
Odyssey image, with nameless, unclaimed stars and planets whooshing
past as we traverse a limitless universe.47
Nevertheless, even cyberspace is likely to require some governance, and
for that reason property imagery is likely to reappear. Larry Lessig, whose
call to scale back property rights in copyright is a part of this symposium,
elsewhere used Central Park and Broadway as analogies for the
Internet48-that is to say, two kinds of public property. Another bit of
43. Id., at 714-17,779-81.
44. See. e.g., Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393 (1991) (considering ecosystem
preservation as public trust). The locus classicus of this literature is Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (arguing that the
traditional doctrine extends to natural resources). I discussed some of the trends in subsequent public
trust thinking in Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 EcoL. L.Q. 351
(1998).
45. For some well-known sharp criticisms, see, for example, James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of
Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); and
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions ofProperty and Sovereignty: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631 (1986).
46. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996) (criticizing undue propertization of intellectual endeavors);
Yochai Benk1er, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence ofSharing as a Modality of
Economic Production, 114 YALE L.1. 273 (2004) (same); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998)
(same); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.1. 1783 (2002) (same); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002)
(same); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED MAG., Jan. 1996, at 134 (same); see also
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1997)
(book review) (same, though criticizing Boyle).
47. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Go1dwyn-Meyer, 1968).
48. Lawrence Lessig, Commons and Code, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.1. 405,
406 (1999). I (ahem!) used Central Park in this way earlier, in Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
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property language is the now somewhat dated-sounding "Information
Superhighway"; a highway is of course public property, at least in the
usual case. And even though that terminology has fallen out of favor, it
does serve as a reminder that cyberspace may have some connections to
the traditional public trust properties, the roads and rivers of earlier
commerce and communication.
Are there other symbolic· presentations of cyberspace as property?
Public property imagery, like parks and highways, seems the most likely
candidate, perhaps interlaced with some private property. Though it may
be a stretch, a recent review of an art history book about the frescos of
Ambrogio Lorenzetti suggests some ideas. Lorenzetti was an artist of
fourteenth-century Siena; the reviewer remarked that while most artists of
heaven and hell gravitate towards hell as the more interesting visual
location, Lorenzetti had a particular knack for depicting the good life.
Indeed, the good life was just outside the window, in the streets of late
medieval Siena, where one could find "bustling shops, circle dances,
construction sites, farmers, [a] pet monkey, and [an] acrobatic cat," all of
which give this artist's work "the incidental detail that usually gives Hell
the visual advantage over Heaven's orderly-and supremely
monotonous-legions. "49
Lorenzetto's picture of Siena might be a useful model for cyberspace. It
would not be the Information Superhighway, which seems rather
impersonal, like 1-80 or 1-95 as they pass through artificial green strips in
the country and high-walled abutments in urban areas, but rather the city
street. On this street there is public access but private property too. People
stop to chat with one another and with the street vendors. They laugh at
the pet monkey's antics, drop into a shop and buy something, or have a
seat and watch the other passers-by.
Lorenzetto's Siena may well be the ideal that many people have for the
Internet and information resources, a mixture of open access and private
property. Of course, a streetscape also suggests a few of the problems that
might be encountered there-pickpockets, for example-since the street is
not really quite heaven. But this is not an example that I want to push too
far in any case-after all, Siena seems a bit small by comparison with
cyberspace. I merely want to suggest that even where the topic is the
commons as wide-open access, a Fifth Panelist might well imagine some
property texts-especially public property texts-and those could very
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129,
154 (1998) (analogizing the Internet to Central Park after dark-risky but exciting). But cf Julie
Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=898260 (extensively discussing and critiquing special metaphors for the
Internet).
49. Ingrid Rowland, What the Frescoes Said, N.Y.REv. BOOKS, Oct. 20, 2005, at 35, 36 (book
review).
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possibly influence the way we think about appropriate legal regimes.
2. Property Texts(?), Part 2: Nature
Moving on through the panels, what might a ghost Fifth Panelist have to
say about property texts relating to the environment? Environmental
subjects, like both versions of the commons, make property symbolism
tricky to find. In fact, some scholars have argued that property is if
anything antithetical to nature, and that the common law of property is
inherently anti-environmental.5o Why is this? The answer is not hard to
find: it· goes back to the Pierson case about ownership of the fox, and
more generally, it goes back to the kinds of symbols that Anglo-American
property law recognizes as conferring ownership. To own the fox, a
person has to kill the fox, or to catch it in nets or a trap from which it
cannot escape. That is the way that the claimant declares clearly to all the
world (or at least the relevant part of it) his unequivocal intention to
remove the unowned thing from the wild and to take it as his own.
Contract language can be more refined and detailed, aimed as it is at one
or a small numbers of recipients; but property language is aimed at a
larger and unknown audience, and its gestures are necessarily rather ham-
handed, Sarah Bernhardt rather than Rilke.
But if it takes large gestures of domination to acquire property in natural
resources, it is hard to think that anyone can claim those resources without
altering them from their natural state. This is a problem in rainforest areas,
where even the laws may encourage claimants to clear off the natural
vegetation in order to bolster their property rightS.51 It is a problem in the
United States as well, for example in connection with water law in the
west. The western states recognize that persons who divert water from a
river may establish a pennanent claim to the diverted water supply.
Diverting water makes it possible to irrigate arable land at some distance
from the river itself, but even more importantly, it is a visible claim to a
certain amount of water. But these western "appropriative" water laws
have had much more difficulty in accommodating so-called "instream"
uses like fishing and habitat protection, precisely because the water
50. See. e.g., John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 519 (1996) [hereinafter Sprankling, Antiwilderness Bias] (arguing that American law favors
exploitative uses over wilderness uses). See also John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of
Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 816, 832-35 (1994) (describing the limited exploitation
required for adverse possession of wilderness).
51. LEE J. ALSTON ET AL., TITLES, CONFLICT, AND LAND USE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY
RiGHTS AND LAND REFORM ON THE AMAZON FRONTIER 57, 59 (1999) (noting clearing as a way to
secure both informal and formal claims); Robert Mendelsohn, Property Rights and Tropical
Deforestation, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 750, 751 (1994) (citing weak property rights and
government recognition of "improvement" as incentives for deforestation); Robert Repetto, Overview,
in PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE MISUSE OF FOREST RESOURCES 1,15-16 (Robert Repetto & Malcolm
Gillis eds., 1988) (same).
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remains in the stream and is not "marked" by any works for diversion,
which would announce both the fact of the property claim and the amount
claimed.52 Groups like the Nature Conservancy have to face similar issues.
It would undercut their purpose to undertake the nature-altering gestures
ordinarily recognized in the common law as property claims, that is, acts
like cutting trees and plowing fields; instead these groups have to rely on
secondary symbols like deeds and recording systems, where paper
documents signal ownership in official records, at some remove from the
thing that is owned. These secondary symbols are all very well where
records are in reasonable condition. But ownership of this sort is under
constant threat in areas where records for land or water rights are poorly
kept, and where the "audience" pays more attention to the land- or water-
altering gestures of an intruder than the paper claims of an environmental
owner.53
In short, environmental groups are often dedicated to passive uses of
resources, and that is their problem. Our Anglo-American legal traditions
do not have a dramatic symbolic vocabulary for passive uses, and this fact
impedes the "writing" of property texts about natural resources, even
where property could be useful-as for example in ownership of land or
water for conservation purposes. Environmental subjects would thus give
a Fifth Panelist an occasion to pinpoint the gestures that our inherited law
recognizes for property-and particularly their limitations and need for
supplementation.
There is another issue about texts that a ghost Fifth Panelist might well
address in connection with the subject of property in nature. That issue
revolves around texts of value or valuation. Because people cannot easily
own environmental goods, like air or water or scenery, these goods do not
appear directly in markets. But if markets do not signal their value, or do
so only imperfectly, we have a hard time figuring out just what their value
is. A ghost panelist might well want to inquire further about this problem
of value: how can value be signaled for environmental goods? If the
market will not do so, what will?
James Salzman has given a good deal of attention to this problem,
writing especially extensively on what he and others call "ecosystem
services.,,54 A wetland area preserves habitat for fish and wild animals; it
52. For an example of the difficulties that instream use faces in appropriative systems, see Idaho
Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924 (Idaho 1974) (permitting instream uses
over objections).
53. See, e.g., Sprankling, Antiwilderness Bias, supra note 50, at 543-47 (noting favo'ritism to land
users and "improvers" over formal title holders during the early settlement of the American west); id.
at 573-74 (noting the continuation of doctrines that favor uses destructive to the wilderness).
54. See, e.g., James Salzman, Creating Markets/or Ecosystem Services: Notes/rom the Field, 80
N.Y.V. L. REv. 870 (2005); James Salzman et ai., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science,
Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 309 (2001)
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also calms storm surges, sponges up floodwaters, and decomposes waste
matter. Insects and bats pollinate fruits, flowers and vegetables. These are
valuable services, and just as important, their value can be measured
against the cost of alternative methods of doing the same things. It is a
very useful exercise to conduct these comparisons, because they remind us
that environmental protection does have some values that are close to the
market, whether or not they are the subject of direct payment or trade.
A Fifth Panelist, however, might also focus on methods of conveying
value that engage symbolism or imagery. What might be some of these
texts of value? Some could be visual, for example Ansel Adams's
haunting pictures of Yosemite and other stunningly beautiful locations in
the west. Before Adams was the mid-nineteenth-century painter Alfred
Bierstadt,' with his strikingly romantic and almost reverentiallandscapes.55
Aldo Leopold told stories about the fish and the geese on his farm when
the rivers rose,56 while modem moviemakers devote full-length features to
birds in flight. Some might be skeptical of some of these depictions, of
course. Adams's Yosemite photos were empty of people, with no sign
either of the tribal peoples who had once lived there or of the modem
tourists who presumably might have ruined the mood.57 Leopold seemed
pretty confident that he understood the satisfaction of those honking geese.
Those bird flight movies have an awful lot of soaring. Bierstadt's work
looks hopelessly sappy to a modem eye. But even sappiness can help
sometimes to raise issues of value. Though the details may be different,
unquestionably the Sierra Club's coffee table books about autumn leaves
serve in the twentieth century as Bierstadt's and others' paintings did in
the nineteenth: they take a subject that looks empty and barren, and tum it
into something alive and valuable.58
While space constrains any extensive discussion here, some member of
the Ghost Panel might also raise a kind of environmental value text that is
if anything the opposite of sappy, and that instead attempts to look hard-
headed and tough-minded. This is something called "contingent
valuation," which attempts to turn environmental issues into the language
of cold cash. The contingent valuation specialist asks questions like this:
"How much would you pay to go see a whale? How much would you pay
55. For Bierstadt and other landscape artists of the American west, and their quasi-religious
attitude toward nature, see BARBARA NOVAK, NATURE AND CULTURE: AMERICAN LANDSCAPE AND
PAINTING 1825-1875, 150-56 (1980) (describing artists' sense that American landscape represented
pure creation).
56. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 23-24 (1949).
57. See SIMON SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY 7 (1995) (observing that the modem
imagination of Yosemite is still Adams's and other artists' empty version).
58. See FINIS DUNAWAY, NATURAL VISIONS: THE POWER OF IMAGES IN AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM (2005).
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simply to know that the whale exists out there in the ocean?,,59
Contingent valuation gets attacked roundly, from both left and right.
Some economists think that the whole enterprise is bogus, for a whole
range of reasons: people are not really spending money, so they can say
anything they please. Some of their answers depend on the order of the
questions, e.g., it is hard to say you would pay only ten dollars for a
whale's existence, when you have already allowed that much for a puny
little otter. Some other answers make no sense at all, as in one hundred
dollars for one whale, and fifty dollars for ten whales. And so on.60 On the
other side, some environmentalists rail against the very idea that
environmental values can be translated into money terms. No wonder, they
say, that people don't understand the question if a survey questioner asks
how much they value a mountain.61
But a Ghost Panelist might not ask for so much precision or literalness.
She might wonder whether contingent valuation is another symbolic
method for staking a claim for environmental values. We do not have a
very large symbolic or linguistic reservoir for expressing the value of
things. But in a commercial society, market language is in that reservoir,
and it is ever-present. "You look like a million bucks!" "You would have
to pay me to go to that party!" We have to make the best of what we have,
and market language is one of the things we do have. This kind of talk
may indeed be jarring with respect to the good things of nature-the
clouds, the animals and plants, the vistas. But perhaps the point is to be
jarring, to wake up a shopping-mall society to the point that there are
valuable things out there that are not part of a market. Language of this
sort may change minds-in a certain way, just as those nature paintings
and photographs change minds.
B. Sniffing Out the Subtexts: Takings and Exchanges
The first two panels, on commons and nature, stretch our capacities to
find texts that do some of the things property is supposed to do-that is,
encourage a careful and orderly use of resources, and to serve as a marker
for value. With takings issues, as with exchange issues, the
communicative conundrums can be quite different. Here texts of property
59. For an overview of the pros and cons, see Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate:
Why Economists Should Care, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (1994); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A.
Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
45 (1994) (unfavorable view); and W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through
Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON PERSPECTIVES 19 (1994) (favorable view).
60. See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 59 (detailing these and other critiques).
61. See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 83-84 (1988) (criticizing contingent valuation as out of line with ordinary valuation).
But see Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to the Temptations of Economic
Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631, 1634-36 (1989)
(attempting to rescue contingent valuation).
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abound. What is more interesting are the kinds of subtexts that these texts
carry-the messages of who counts and who does not and why, and the
anxieties that go along with those questions.
1. Takings.
When governments are accused of "taking" an owner's property under
the guise of regulation, property language bursts at the seams. Indeed,
some might say that this is a locus in which there is altogether too much
property talk. At least one language issue, though, is about the subtexts
behind the property talk: that is, the question is not about the thing taken,
but about what the governmental action conveys about the owner himself
or herself. What the owner reads into the alleged taking may well be the
subtext: You do not matter.
Here I need to make a slight excursion: the language of rights has come
under some attack in the legal community, from the left because it is said
that rights-language acts as a smokescreen to obscure the injustice of
actual allocations of wealth and power, and from the right because rights-
talk is said to harden lines and impede reasonable negotiations over
important matters.62 On the other hand, one defense of rights-talk is that
the language of rights conveys the message that the rights-holder is a
person who matters, a person whose decisions and opinions have to be
taken seriously. For example, people dealing with battered women have
tried to inculcate in their clients a sense that the clients are rights-holders,
and that as rights-holders, they are entitled to be treated with respect.63
Property is a very tangible kind of right, especially when it attaches to
tangibles like land, and thus property gives out a very tangible signal that
the rights-holder does matter. E.M. Forster wrote a funny little essay on
this topic, "My Wood," in which he described his purchase of a piece of
woodland and recounted the internal changes that the experience wrought
on his psyche.64 His first reaction, he reported, was that he felt more
substantial, literally heavier. A freeholder, a man of substance, of course.
But Forster's sensations are not entirely just a laughing matter. For
example, in China, the government has allowed people to buy their
apartments in the last few years, but it has also faced what was probably
an unexpected political effect. Newly minted apartment owners feel
"heavier" too. More specifically, they think that as owners, they have
62. See. e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS-TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (presenting a critique from a conservative perspective); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights. 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1382-94 (1984) (presenting a leftist critique).
63. See. e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 597-98, 611-12 (1986).
64. E.M. FORSTER, My Wood, in MINGER HARVEST AND ENGLAND'S PLEASANT LAND 21
(1936).
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something to say about city politics, and they have started grassroots
organizations for that purpose, branching out to other cities and creating
larger citizen networks. 65
To come back to the takings issue, then, and to the subtext that an owner
may read into cavalier treatment of his property: you don't matter. In the
past, large-scale governmental expropriations have frequently targeted
people who are classed as enemies, including expropriations here in the
United States: Tories during the American Revolution, Native Americans
on the frontier (in spite of nominal payment), citizens of Japanese origin in
World War 11.66 More recently, expropriations have been very much a part
of ethnic cleansings in Europe, as with the Jews in the 1930s, and more
recently with the various ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia. Given the
link between expropriation and enmity, it is not entirely surprising that
people who think their property rights are taken also think that they are
being treated as if they were expendable. Indeed, that can be the case even
when the taking is compensated, as in the exercise of eminent domain, a
subject of much furor in the recent past.67 Money compensation may not
be enough when you perceive that what you have lost is your dignity and
your respect in the community.
On the other hand, there is a great deal of posturing about takings issues,
and a fair number of overblown claims, for example from people who find
that they cannot fill and subdivide their wetlands property when those
actions contribute to flooding downstream. In such cases, owners claim a
property right to do something that affects the neighbors or the public
adversely.68 Here property rights should be arrayed against property rights,
but unfortunately, land is solid and relatively easy to understand as
property-much easier to depict as property than are the diffuse
neighborly and public resources like air and water and wildlife, even
though the latter resources lie adjacent to land and are deeply affected by
65. See Jonathan Kaufman, New Crop ofProtesters in Tiananmen Square: Restive Homeowners,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2004, at Al (describing a new homeowners' organization and its protests).
66. I explored several of these expropriations in Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REv. I.
67. The case Kelo v. City ofNew London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), in which the Supreme Court
found that economic development could be a "public purpose" for purposes of eminent domain, has
raised an unusual hue and cry that property rights are threatened. See, e.g., Avi Salzman & Laura
Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling, N.V. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at
A20 (reporting on the reaction to Kelo and on planned legislative initiatives to limit eminent domain).
68. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote
More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 34, at 221, 223-24, 249-51 (2004)
(noting a tendency to underregulate property owners even where their actions cause environmental
harm); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 72 1-36 (2000) (describing several Supreme Court Justices' tendencies
to disregard environmental concerns in a number of cases, including some on property rights); see also
Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Takings and the Nature ofProperty, 9 CANAD. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
16 I, 190 (1996) (noting the overblown rhetoric of property rights in the Supreme Court, in spite of the
limited effect in fact).
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land uses. The subtext of personal slight attaches especially strongly to
individual property-and especially to landed property-and the danger is
that this sense of slight may be so great as to eclipse a more rational
conversation about the content of property rights, including land rights, in
a changing environmental context.
Economists tell us that property rights regimes need to change in the
face of changes in demand for resources.69 In turn, this means that
property law has to come to grips with the great touchiness of individual
property rights. In keeping with a linguistic tum about property rights, I
have been arguing for some time that we need a more robust language of
"public rights" in the United States. In this country, the language of
individual property is extremely well-developed, but as citizens, the rest of
us could use a better vocabulary for expressing public claims.70 My own
view is that this kind of language was better developed in the nineteenth
century, with more nuances and a more sharply defined sense of when and
where public claims begin than we now enjoy.71 A Fifth Panelist might
well explore this question, asking where the language ofpublic rights went
and why, and how some recourse to it today might be recovered, now that
public resources like water, air, and wildlife are so severely pressured. The
subtext behind the eclipse of public-rights discourse is that the public does
not matter, whereas a recovery of the texts of public rights could bolster
the sense that public claims and decisions command respect along with
private ones.
2. Gifts, Bargains, and Power
I mentioned earlier that for some people with takings claims, mere
money compensation is not enough to satisfy. Are they the only ones with
this attitude? This subject of money brings us to the fourth panel: gifts,
bargains and power. As with takings issues, this general area of exchange
relationships seldom falls short when it comes to texts of property. But
again as with takings, a Fifth Panelist might be just as interested in the
subtexts as in the texts of property.
But our Fifth Panelist would feel right at home here, because many
others too have been interested in the subtexts of exchange relationships.
One of the major intellectual subjects within exchange relationships is
69. GARY LiBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-2 (1989).
70. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property. Public Rights, and the
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996); Carol M. Rose, Environmental
Lessons, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1023, 1042-43 (1994); see also Victor Flatt, This Land Is Your Land
(Our Right to an Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. I, 3-6 (2004) (arguing for a language of
environmental rights properly to assess environmental values).
71. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History,
72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 222-24 (1984) (describing nineteenth-century legal usage).
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 26 2006
26 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Supp.:l
what Margaret Radin has called "commodification."n It is also the subject
on which the panelist Martha Ertman has just published a book.73 The
commodification question is this: What does it mean to say that something
can be purchased for money, or purchased at all? What if the something is
a kidney? What if it is the right to pollute (to use an environmental
example)? What if it is sexual services, as in prostitution? What if it is a
baby? What if it is free speech?
Michael Sandel states one major concern: it is that a market transaction
will somehow undermine or corrupt the very thing exchanged.74 Hence on
one interpretation, we do not allow market transactions in certain kinds of
goods, e.g. body parts. They may be given away, but not sold, because
selling conveys a mistaken message and undermines the thing sold,
encouraging, in this example, the sale of unhealthy organs or tissue. The
exchange itself carries a self-contradictory subtext. The same can be said
of the market treatment of sexual services: love for sale, in the old cliche.
Here too the subtext contradicts the text, because love cannot be bought
and sold and still be love. So goes the anti-commodification argument, or
one of them.
But there are a number of problems with this view. One problem is that
love can become part of an exchange relationship. Included in Martha
Ertman's new book is an essay by the political scientist Deborah Stone,
who writes about paid caregivers and their relationships to their clients.75
As Stone beautifully puts it, "love creeps in.,,76 Caregivers and their
patients and their families come to care about one another deeply, despite
the origins of their relationship in a commercial transaction, in which
money payment is very much a part.
A second problem, of course, is that gifts themselves are not immune
from the undermining subtext-far from it. Ralph Waldo Emerson's
famous essay on gifts argued that there is something domineering about
giving gifts, and not everyone likes to receive them.77 They put the
recipient in the position of a debtor, and a lot of us do not like feeling like
72. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalineability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); her more recent
work on this subject is MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996). Another term for
commodification is Igor Kopytoff's "commoditization"; see his The Cultural Biography of Things:
Commoditization as Process, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 64 (Ariun Appadurai ed., 1986).
73. RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha
Ertman & Joan Williams eds., 2005).
74. Michael J. Sandel, Markets. Morals. and Civic Life, BULL. AM. ACAD ARTS & SCI., 6, 8
(Summer 2005).
75. Deborah Stone, For Love Nor Money: The Commodification of Care, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 73, at 271.
76. Id. at 275.
77. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Gifts, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF RALPH
WALOO EMERSON 402, 403-04 (Brook Atkinson ed., 1940).
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debtors, particularly to whomever it was who gave the gift. Many of us
notice this unease at holidays. Holidays are full of jockeying for position
about who is supposed to give what to whom and how much each is
supposed to pay. Anthropologists are familiar with these patterns, and
those who write about gift-exchange patterns often describe the intense
web of mutual obligations that grow up around gift-giving.
But this leads to a third problem: by comparison with gift exchange
(with all the exquisite nuances and obligatory overlays), market exchanges
may seem quite liberating. Yes, yes, gift exchange is very deeply
interpersonal and all that, but sometimes it can be nice just to deal with
strangers. That will be twenty bucks, says the guy at the gas station. He
may smile, but it is still twenty bucks. You may smile too as you hand him
the Jackson, but you can drive away and never see him again. And that,
for some, is just the way it should be. Who wants to have to have an
intimate relationship with the gas station guy just to be able to drive
around?
There is another subtext to market transactions that might have
interested a Fifth Panelist, particularly since it is one that is somewhat
neglected in the literature about commodification. It is easy to see the
marketplace as a locus where money rules, and where the rich dominate
the poor. But there are other aspects of the market that have a somewhat
different political message, and that deserve some study in democratic
theory. First, in a market transaction, the merchant is appealing to your
voluntary consent rather than forcing you to do something or requiring
you to defer to her superior status. Second, the merchant has to attempt to
understand what you want; otherwise you will walk away and there will be
no gains from trade, at least for her. Third, the merchant and the customer
can sideline or bracket their differences in other areas, and instead they
can simply concentrate on the subjects that are of mutual interest to them.
These aspects of market transactions have some important parallels to the
kind of behavior we need in the political sphere: voluntarism, a quest for
mutual understanding, and the sidelining of unnecessary conflict while
pursuing mutually beneficial goals.
Once again, we do not have very many linguistic or symbolic resources
at hand for democratic politics, especially in a large and diverse nation
where strangers have to make decisions together. But we do have market
behavior. Despite excesses (and there certainly are some), market behavior
is by and large decent and cooperative, even among strangers. Market
transactions rest on a very thin set of norms at the outset-self-interest
rightly understood-but markets can supply strangers with a conveyer belt
to repeat exchanges and to denser and more affect-laden relationships. As
Deborah Stone so felicitously puts it, love creeps in.
None of this is to say that market transactions are a perfect solution to
democratic politics. This is clearly not the case. There are too many issues
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 28 2006
28 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Supp.:l
of distribution and backlash, too many market failures, too many inbred
hostilities from other sources. But the subtexts of property and trade do
have some affinities with democratic politics, and we ought to be
conscious of that fact, and not simply dismissive. We do not have enough
models and symbols to throw out any without due perusal.
CONCLUSION
In all the subjects above, I have tried to sketch out a few areas where the
ghost panelists of the Fifth Panel, on Property and Language, might have
had something to say. They are also all areas where humanists have
something to learn from economists, and vice versa. Small wonder that the
subject of property and language bridges the gap between economics and
the humanities! Property is both an economic institution of great power,
but it is also a highly sociable institution, dependant on symbolic gestures
that link claimants and audiences. It is unquestionably the case that those
symbolic systems break down at times-gestures are too obscure, cultures
are insufficiently shared, intended audiences do not or will not
countenance the gestures they see, claimants and counterclaimants resort
to force. It is undoubtedly the case, too, that there are normative questions
whether some property gestures deserve recognition.
But in the end, all the panels raise these questions. Indeed, once that is
recognized, perhaps we can lay the ghost of the Fifth Panel, and think that
it was not so important after all, and that it can safely remain a ghost. In a
sense, property and language are simply property itself.
